This course has two parts: 6 cfu by Vittorioemanuele Ferrante; 3 cfu by Annalisa Luporini.
First module: Introduction to game theory; strategic forms and Bayesian games; concepts of equilibrium; dominance and rationalizability; games in extensive forms with perfect and imperfect information; sequential equilibria and refinements; elements of repeated games.
Second module: Informational asymmetries and market failure. Adverse selection: consequences on market equilibrium and public intervention. Signaling: the education signaling game. Screening in a competitive market. The principal-agent problem with i) hidden actions and ii) hidden information.
First module:
Osborne and Rubinstein, A course in game theory, MIT 1994 (on-line version 2012).
Second module:
Mas-Colell A., Whinston M. and Green J, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press 1995 ch.13,14 and instructor notes.
Learning Objectives
The first module provides the student with an introduction to the fundamental concepts of game theory. The second module provides the student with an introduction to information economics.
Prerequisites
The course requires a basic knowledge of microeconomics, calculus, statistics and probability.
Teaching Methods
Class lectures and seminars in which students present papers or course topics suggested by the instructor.
Further information
For additional information, please ask the instructors through email or during office hours.
Type of Assessment
The exam is both written and oral. Class work will be considered as well.
Course program
First module. From Osborne and Rubinstein: Chapts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, and parts of chpt. 8. Second module: Mas-Colell , Whinston e Green: Chapts. 13 and 14; teacher notes on the principal agent model with hidden information.