Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. Political economics: explaining economic policy. MIT press, 2002.
Learning Objectives
Providing the theoretical tools to study economic policy in modern democracies, the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, the extent of corruption by public officials, the structure of labor market regulation.
Prerequisites
Microeconomics, Macroeconomics.
Teaching Methods
Formal lectures.
Further information
Class participation is recommended.
Type of Assessment
Written exam.
Course program
A General Policy Problem
Restricting Preferences
Restricting Institutions
A Model of Public Finance
Downsian Electoral Competition
Median-Voter Equilibria
Probabilistic Voting
Lobbying
Efficient Electoral Competition
Inefficient Electoral Competition
Enforceability, Verifiability, and Observability
Electoral Accountability
Career Concerns
Policy Convergence
Policy Divergence
Endogenous Candidates
Legislative Bargaining
General Transfers
Pensions
Regional Transfers
Unemployment Insurance
Model of Local Public Goods
Legislative Bargaining
A Lobbying Model
Electoral competition
Interactions