THE COVID-19 ECONOMIC CRISIS


Guido Lorenzoni


Lecture @Università di Firenze




CONTRACTION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

460,000.						
440,000.	_					
420,000.						
400,000.						
380,000.						
360,000.		 				
340,000.						
320,000.						
300,000.	J-18	M-18	J-18	S-18	N-18	j.






EMPLOYMENT IN DIFFERENT AREAS




Source: BLS

EMPLOYMENT ACROSS SECTORS (US)



Source: BLS

EMPLOYMENT BY WAGE QUARTILE (US)



Source: Chetty et al. (2020)


PANDEMIC SHOCK

- > Asymmetric effects: some sectors more directly hurt
- Heterogeneity: some workers more hurt
- Mix of supply and demand disturbances:
 - Restaurants have to close, workers laid off have to adjust spending
 - > Some producers have to shut down, constraints on supply chain, disruption in payments
- Policy debate: Role for stimulus? Stimulus or relief? What tools?
- Textbook approach: excess supply or excess demand?
- > Too simplistic: some sectors can be demand constrained other supply constrained, supply constraints in one sector can generate demand constraints in another
- Analysis based on Guerrieri, Lorenzoni, Straub, Werning (2020)

BEFORE THE PANDEMIC SHOCK


> 2-sector economy: A contact-intensive and B not contact-intensive

> The two sectors are symmetric before the pandemic



PROPAGATION WITH COMPLETE MARKETS


- Pandemic shock = complete shut down of sector A
- Key question: how does the shock propagate from A to B ?






PROPAGATION WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS

- Incomplete markets: fraction of workers are borrowing constrained
- + workers are specialized in their sector



SECTOR B not contact intensive

SECTOR B WORKERS fraction μ borrowing constrained



MODEL

> Preferences

- > Constant elasticity of substitution across goods ϵ
- > Constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ
- > Technology: for j = A, B

- Immobile labor:
 - $\blacktriangleright \phi$ workers specialized in A
 - > 1 ϕ workers specialized in *B*

$\sum_{t=0} \beta^t U(c_{At}, c_{Bt})$

 $Y_{jt} = N_{jt}$

MODEL (CONTINUED)

Agents trade one-period bonds

Budget constraint

> Fraction μ face borrowing constraint

Limit cases:

 $\succ \epsilon \rightarrow \infty$: one sector model

> $\mu \rightarrow 0$: complete market model

$p_{At}c_{iAt} + p_{Bt}c_{iBt} + a_{it} \le w_t n_{it} + (1 + i_{t-1})a_{it-1}$

 $a_{it} \ge 0$

PANDEMIC SHOCK

- Economy in steady state
- Time 0: temporary reduction in labor supply in sector A
- > Shock generates an increase in the (shadow) price of sector A similarly to
 - health risk associated to consuming in sector A
 - tax wedge in sector A due to government intervention
- Time 1,2,3,...: back to normal (flexible price allocation)
- > Assumptions:
 - Nominal wages are downward rigid at time 0
 - Central Bank keeps interest rate unchanged

Extreme case: zero labor supply (total shutdown)



KEYNESIAN SUPPLY SHOCKS

Welfare-based CPI:

Individual demand at t=0

Keynesian Supply Shock: shock to sector A generates demand shortage in sector B

 Y_{R}

 $Y_B <$

$$\mathbf{P} = \left(\phi p_A^{1-\epsilon} + 1 - \phi\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}$$

$$= (1 - \phi) \left(\frac{1}{P}\right)^{-\epsilon} P^{-\sigma}$$


$$Y_B^* = 1 - \phi$$

COMPLETE MARKETS

Result: Multiple sectors + Complete Markets Supply shock Demand shortage iff $\sigma > \epsilon$

> When p_A increases, P increases \rightarrow two effects:


- 1. cheaper to consume tomorrow
- 2. good B cheaper than good A






INCOMPLETE MARKETS


Result: Multiple sectors + Incomplete MarketsSupply shockDemand shortage iff
 $\sigma > f(\epsilon)$






INCOMPLETE MARKETS EFFECT

How many agents are unconstrained?








Condition for KSS: $(1 - \mu \phi) P^{\epsilon - \sigma} < 1$

individual demand of unconstrained


CONSUMPTION FUNCTION



Current income y_0

SPENDING ACROSS SECTORS


Figure 5: Credit card spending growth across spending categories



Source: Cox, Ganong, Noel, Vavra, Wong, Farrell, Greig



EMPLOYMENT ACROSS SECTORS



From Brinca, Duarte, Faria e Castro (2020)

FISCAL POLICY

MULTIPLIER

Spending and transfers at date 0

> Transfers with replacement rate ρ so income after transfers is: $n_{i0} +$

- Constant future tax, all on non-constrained agents
- \blacktriangleright Result: multiplier on G = 1!
- > Distributional effect as in Patterson (2019), but in reverse!

G + T = D

$$\rho(1-n_{j0})$$

> No 2nd round Keynesian cross operating because sector A incomes do not respond!

FISCAL POLICY

Focus on situation with Keynesian supply shock. How does fiscal policy help?

SECTOR A contact intensive, size ϕ

SECTOR B not contact intensive, $1 - \phi$




SECTOR A WORKERS fraction μ s.t. borrowing constraint



FISCAL POLICY

► Focus on situation with Keynesian supply shock. How does fiscal policy help?




But: Insurance value of transfer is important due to asymmetry of the shock!

SECTOR B not contact intensive, $1 - \phi$

SECTOR B WORKERS fraction μ s.t. borrowing constraint

STIMULUS AND RELIEF


- Stimulus effect peters out before reaching full insurance...



> Fiscal transfers have two effects: stimulating demand and providing social insurance!



SOCIAL INSURANCE AT WORK



A. Seasonally Adjusted Spending Changes by Income Quartile

Chetty, Friedman, Hendren, Stepner, Opportunity Insights Team (2000)

FISCAL POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH


> Add health dimension

t=0

- > 3 issues: demand shortage in sector B, lack of insurance, health externality
- > What should happen to output in sector A? Trade-off between Keynesian wedge and Pigouvian externality
- > Targeted transfers not only stimulate demand and help increase social insurance, but also help reduce the cost of public health policies and making them more desirable (complementarity)

$\sum \beta^t \left(U(c_{At}, c_{Bt}) + \xi_t h(c_{At}, Y_{At}) \right)$

COMPLEMENTARITY





FISCAL SUPPORT


Fiscal support has been massive, but not everywhere

Figure 1.14. <i>(Change in struc</i>)
The fiscal stance i 2021.
10 -
8 -
6 -
- 4 -
2 -
- 0
-2 -
-4 -
- -6 -
- —8 -
-10
Auva

Figure 1.14. Fiscal Stance, 2019–21

ictural primary fiscal balance, percent of potential GDP)

is expected to remain accommodative in advanced economies in



CONCLUSIONS

- Pandemic as an asymmetric sectoral shock
- > Shock can propagate to the rest of the economy through demand shortages because of complementarities and incomplete markets
- Transfers both in US and EU have worked to prevent major spillovers
- Difference in emphasis:
 - > US more income support, less concern with preserving labor matches
 - > EU more emphasis on preserving matches (Kurzarbeit, Cassa integrazione)
- Concern for need of reallocation after reopening
- Current debate on stimulus, risk of overheating? Maybe good for reallocation?